Aid instruments for peace- and state-building: Putting the New Deal into practice
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New Deal case study

Central African Republic (CAR)
Multi-Partner Trust Fund (Ezingo Fund)
1. Central African Republic (CAR) – Background, aid context and New Deal progress

CAR is a country which has been marked by chronic socio-economic, political and security challenges. As a result in 2013 CAR was ranked 187 out of 188 countries on the human development index (HDI 2015), with around two thirds of its population living on less than $1.25 a day (WDI 2015). Due to its frequent outbreaks of conflict and related political crises, CAR is categorised as a fragile state and is a member of the g7+ Group.

CAR has long been an aid orphan, as it receives amongst the lowest level of Official Development Assistance (ODA) amongst fragile countries in Africa. Historically few donors have been present in the country with the largest being France, the EU, the UN and the World Bank.

Since late 2012 CAR has been dealing with a new outbreak of widespread conflict. It began when members of a number of rebel groups (who came together in an alliance or ‘Seleka’) overran the North and centre of the country, reaching the capital in March 2013 and over-throwing the Government. Following the coup, security deteriorated further as fighting spread between communities supporting the Seleka and opposing it (Anti-Balaka). As a result by the end of 2013, an estimated 2.2 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance and over 800,000 had fled their homes (Barbelet 2015). This led the UN to deploy a large peace-keeping operation in 2014 which took over leadership of an existing African Union mission, also working alongside French troops. Peace talks and efforts to form a transitional Government [and agree a strategic roadmap to guide the transitional period, the ‘Feuille de route de la Transition’] have since helped to calm the conflict. However, there is still frequent fighting and community tensions remain high.

CAR’s crisis has attracted international attention, although this was slow to emerge. By the end of 2014, over 100 humanitarian organisations had set up operations in the country and $337m had been raised in response to the UN’s appeal for funding (Barbelet 2015). The UN’s efforts to support CAR have been guided by the UN Secretary General’s six point initiative to restore security, support critical state-building, political and reconciliation priorities, and promote recovery (UNSG 2014).

CAR is a member of the g7+ Group of fragile states and is also one of the New Deal pilot countries. However, this period of conflict led to New Deal processes being put on hold, although donors have been keen to emphasise the importance of its principles in taking forward their programmes.

2. Introducing the Central African Republic Multi-Partner Trust Fund (Ezingo Fund)

The Ezingo Fund was established by the UN as multi-donor facility to support the financing of a coordinated response to stabilization, peace consolidation and recovery efforts in CAR.

The Ezingo Funds aims to channel assistance towards three priority areas:

- Immediate Impact Projects based on the UN Secretary General’s six point initiative in support of state authority; reconciliation and mediation; early recovery; and economic revitalization
- Transitional strategic priorities in the short to medium term based on the Government’s Feuille de route and Programme d’Urgence (Roadmap and Emergency Programme)
- Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) in support of the New Deal: PSG 1 - Inclusive Politics; PSG 2 - Security; PSG 3 - Justice; PSG 4 - Economic Foundations; PSG 5 - Services and Revenues

The Ezingo Fund has two operational windows to channel assistance: i) A UN Window – for UN agencies to access funding; ii) A National Window – for funding direct to and through government [see more details below]. It is stated that operating in such a way allows the Government to “balance the need for rapid response and reduce risks with the need to ensure government ownership and capacity development” [UNDP 2015].

The Ezingo Fund is governed by a Steering Committee which is co-chaired by the Government and the UN Deputy Representative to the Secretary General / Resident Coordinator (DSRSG/RC) and includes
representatives from United Nations, donors and civil society. The main role of the Steering Committee is to make funding decisions and oversee project implementation.

As of November 2015, $24m in funding had been disbursed to the Ezingo Fund, with contributions from a range of international agencies, including: the US Government’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs/INL ($11.2m), the Government of the Netherlands ($6.2m) the UN Peacebuilding Fund ($4.6m), and the Government of Norway ($2m).

### Status of Ezingo projects, as of November 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Implementing agency (and funding window)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Payment of salaries to police and gendarmerie (May-September 2014)</td>
<td>$4.50m</td>
<td>Government of CAR (National Window)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- to provide emergency assistance to the CAR Government for the salaries of the police and gendarmerie [COMPLETED]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to rehabilitate barracks and registration of security services (September-December 2014) – to support the security sector by: i) creating a security sector registration system, and: ii) rehabilitating two large barracks in Bangui [ONGOING]</td>
<td>$1.10m</td>
<td>UNDP (UN Window)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fight against violations of human rights and the revival of Justice in CAR (October 2014-September 2017) – to provide in Bangui and a range of other cities: i) Institutional support to strengthen the capabilities of the judicial system to provide an appropriate response to the current situation and the numerous violations of human rights: (ii) Community support to strengthen the safety and protection of communities [ONGOING]</td>
<td>$11.1m</td>
<td>UNDP (UN Window)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangui Unit for holistic care of victims of rape and violence [12 months] – to provide holistic care of rape victims in Bangui, addressing issues relating to sexually transmitted infections [e.g. HIV / AIDS], unwanted pregnancies and psychological trauma and stigma [ONGOING]</td>
<td>$0.91m</td>
<td>WHO, UNFPA and UNICEF (UN Window)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to the rehabilitation of health facilities in conflict affected areas – helping to build the capacity of health facilities in Basse Kotto and Ouaka to enable them to operate beyond humanitarian assistance [COMMITTED, begin Jan 2016]</td>
<td>$1.08m</td>
<td>UNDP and PAM (UN Window)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to reduce the vulnerability of teenagers and youth - education and vocational training program for teenagers and youth in Boda, Yaloke, Sibut, Mbres, Grimari, Kouango and Bambari [COMMITTED, begin Jan 2016]</td>
<td>$1.29m</td>
<td>UNDP and FAO (UN Window)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP 2015
As can be seen from the table above, as of November 2015 $17.6m (in addition to the $0.4m in running costs for the CAR MPTF Secretariat) had been transferred to implementing organisations for the delivery of four projects. Funding for an additional two projects – on health and youth vulnerability – has been committed and will begin being disbursed in January 2016. Of these six projects one [payment of police salaries] has been implemented through the National Window, with the others utilising the UN Window.

3. Programme emergence and drivers

This section details how this programme emerged, including previous cooperation it built upon and the key drivers that facilitated its emergence. Such an analysis is not only of interest for understanding how this programme can be successfully implemented, but can also help to guide political and technical collaboration between Governments and donors to develop innovative programmes in comparable contexts.

The Ezingo Fund was established in early 2014 at the height of the crisis in CAR, following a needs assessment and based on joint agreement between the UN and the CAR government. At the time of its establishment, it was the first major channel for funding interventions beyond humanitarian priorities, which were being addressed by the UN Common Humanitarian Fund.

In discussions during the design phase, the CAR Ministry of Planning emphasised to the UN the importance of the Ezingo Fund supporting implementation of the New Deal, especially alignment with government priorities and systems. The New Deal is therefore addressed extensively in the project documents, and the role of the Government in co-chairing the Fund as well as the Fund’s National Window are practical expressions of the New Deal approach to aid.

One of the imperatives for getting the Ezingo Fund up and running was the delay in the payment of salaries to the police. The police [and civil servants in general] had not been paid for a long time and low morale and the potential for a breakdown in the security services was considered a factor which risked exacerbating the conflict. The funding of police salaries was therefore the first intervention of the Ezingo Fund [see table in section 3].

4. How the programme addresses the New Deal principles

This section identifies the primary New Deal principles addressed by this programme and how its design aimed to support their implementation.

Peace-building and State-building goals (PSGs)
– The terms of reference of the Ezingo Fund state that it aims to address all of the PSGs during its lifetime. To date the projects which have been funded have directly contributed to addressing PSG 2 – justice [through a large programme of support for rebuilding the justice sector] and PSG 3 – security [through financing police salaries, rehabilitating army barracks in Bangui and creating a register of security service providers]. Amongst the pipeline of projects still to be financed through the Fund are further project addressing these goals, but also for PSG 4 – economic foundations [economic support to returnee women and youth, and reintegrating ex-combatants] and PSG 5 – services and revenues [a range of health and education interventions] (UNDP 2015).

Use of Country Systems – This approach to providing funding has been pushed by the Government and been clearly addressed in the decision to include a National Window for channelling the Fund’s assistance. So far one project has utilised this channel – the payment of police salaries - which has represented around one-quarter of disbursed funds to date. The Ezingo Fund’s use of country systems [and its engagement with the Government] contrasts with that of an EU Trust Fund recently established in CAR which does not deliver through Government institutions.

Risk sharing – The use of the National Window in support of police salaries was justified on the basis of the risks of non-intervention on the integrity of the security services in CAR. It is reported that this is the first time that UN funding has been used to pay the salaries of national security services. It is also clear that that the pooling of funding through the Fund helps donors to mitigate the risks involved in funding interventions such as support to the police.

One vision one plan – The transitional Government’s Feuille de route and Programme d’Urgence [Roadmap and Emergency Programme] are stated in the Ezingo Fund’s founding documents as the framework guiding
interventions. The Government’s role in co-chairing the Fund’s Steering Committee also provides it with an opportunity to keep donors focussed on national priorities. However, this research was not able to test the degree to which the Government is able to assert its ownership of this programme in practice.

The Ezingo Fund therefore primarily supports efforts to pursue the PSG pillar of the New Deal, whilst also supporting some critical elements of the FOCUS and TRUST pillars.

5. Programme impacts and challenges

The Ezingo Fund began its operations in mid-2014, and as a result only one project has been completed and fully reported on – “the payment of salaries to police and gendarmerie” [see table above]. This project has supported the Government to carry out a census of these security services to ensure its payroll is up to date, and then to pay the salaries of between 3,811 police and gendarmerie across the period May to August.

Perhaps the main challenge the Ezingo Fund has faced is accessing adequate and predictable funding from donors in order to resource planning activities. There is currently a pipeline of ten projects that have been submitted and approved (UNDP 2014), but which have not yet been funded due to inadequate levels of resourcing from donors. This issue is partly a result of the fact that the European Union has initiated its own Trust Fund in CAR which is pursuing funding from many of the same donors. It is also related to the CAR’s long-standing experience of being neglected by the aid community.

There are continued challenges in coordinating the Ezingo Fund’s interventions with humanitarian programmes, but also the EU’s Trust Fund. Steps have been taken to try to improve coordination but donor and government staff are very stretched on the ground. Greater investment is needed in this area, including dedicated capacity to ensure this coordination takes place.

There have been also been challenges posed by the security situation and lack of infrastructure, which has made it difficult to convene the Steering Group, for monitoring projects and for project implementation. The launch of the largest project funded to date – that focussed on the Fight against violations of human rights and the revival of Justice [see table above] – was delayed due to ongoing security challenges.

6. Lessons learnt

As already suggested, given that the Ezingo Fund has only recently begun its operations it is too early to be making full conclusions about the lessons which can be learnt from its work. However, it is useful to reflect on some lessons which have emerged during its initial operations, including:

1. The benefits of operating a UN window and a national window - this approach provides an opportunity for funders with differing appetites for risk and engagement with the Transitional Government to support the Fund, with the UN Window available to those funders showing greater reluctance to pursue such options

2. The importance of developing a division of labour across donor initiatives - although there are continued challenges in coordinating donor activities across the issues they are addressing the Ezingo Fund has helped to address these challenges by looking beyond the significant humanitarian and development challenges being addressed by other actors and primarily addressing security and justice issues

3. Coordination across relevant actors requires significant capacity, especially in post-conflict contexts – illustrated by how the lack of donor and Government capacity on the ground has held back progress on coordination across the various activities being supported by the international community
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Central African Republic (CAR) Multi-Partner Trust Fund [Ezingo Fund]

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